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Risk, returns, and biases 
of listed private equity portfolios 
 
Heinz Zimmermanna  
Stéphanie Bilob 




This is the first empirical paper investigating a comprehensive sample of listed 
(i.e. publicly traded) private equity companies, covering 287 companies in the 
time period 1986 to 2003. After imposing liquidity constraints, and after 
correcting for non-surviving vehicles, we get a sample of 114 instruments. The 
risk and return characteristics of three portfolio strategies, two partially 
rebalanced and one fully rebalanced, are compared. We moreover address 
potential biases resulting from thin trading, the bid-ask spread, and sample 
selection. We show that the adjusted performance figures differ substantially 
from standard estimates. But even after correcting for these biases, we find a 
high risk-adjusted performance of this asset class before 2000, and dramatic 
different results between the three indices if we extend the time period to 2003.  
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1. Introduction 
Private Equity has become an important asset category in recent years. However, as with other 
alternative investments, the determination of reliable risk and return characteristics is 
complicated by several specific investment characteristics: Typically no market prices are 
available or the liquidity of the instruments is very limited rendering conventional risk measures 
virtually meaningless. Moreover, Cochrane (2005) shows that commonly computed venture 
capital performance measures are affected by a strong selection bias. This paper addresses some 
of these topics from a somewhat different perspective. Our contribution is threefold: 
- We investigate a sample of listed (i.e. publicly traded) private equity (LPE) companies 
where market prices are available, and where we are able to impose certain minimum 
liquidity constraints; 
- In contrast to other studies on alternative investments, we demonstrate the difficulties and 
biases in computing basic portfolio returns: rebalancing is a particularly important issue in 
this asset class due to the heterogeneity of the individual vehicles in terms of market 
capitalization, share price performance, and liquidity;   
- We moreover correct for these biases and compute adjusted estimates of risk and return 
by investigating two liquidity biases: the volatility bias related to the autocorrelation 
structure of portfolio returns, and the bid-ask bias related to rebalancing.  
 We analyze the risk and return of a comprehensive sample of listed private equity vehicles 
which constitute an attractive and rapidly growing segment within the overall private equity 
market. From a practical perspective, this market segment is a particularly important and viable 
asset class for institutional investors, who are mostly restricted to invest in non-traded financial 
vehicles. Even though the vehicles in our sample may not necessarily be representative for the 
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private equity market as a whole, private equity investors accept indices (such as the LPX, the 
listed private equity index) of traded instruments as a benchmark for their performance 
Obviously, the advantage of this market segment is the availability of market prices which 
enables more reliable performance measures. Since private equity is by definition a business area 
that deals with investments in non-listed companies, we were surprised to identify a total of 287 
private equity vehicles listed on worldwide stock exchanges. We were thus able to construct 
representative portfolios which can be used to study the risk and return characteristics of this 
asset class, and which potentially serve as valid benchmarks for comparisons with traditional 
investments. There are several papers on risk and return characteristics of non-quoted private 
equity1, but only a few studies on the risk and return characteristics of listed private equity 
companies. They moreover date back to the 1980s. Martin/Petty (1983) identify 37 venture 
capital firms during 1970 and 1980, but only 17 have price data available from 1974-1979. 
Another six companies are not analyzed due to inactive trading. Their sample finally includes 
                                                 
1
 Bygrave and Timmons (1992) study the performance of venture capital funds for 1974-1989. They calculate an 
internal rate of return of these funds of 13.5% without providing any risk calculations. Gompers and Lerner (1997a) 
examine the investments of one venture capital firm for 1972-1997 and report an arithmetic average annual return of 
30.5%. Long (1999) studies nine VC investments and comes up with a standard deviation of 8.23% per year. 
Moskowitz/Jorgensen (2002) report  that the risk and return trade-off to private equity is worse than to public equity. 
They conclude that non-pecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival 
could potentially explain an investment in private equity. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) base their calculations 
on actual cash flows of venture capital and buyout funds. They find an internal rate of return of 19.8% and state that 
this excess return compensates the investor for holding an illiquid investment for a certain time period. Cochrane 
(2004) measures the mean, standard deviation, alpha and beta of venture capital investments for 1987 to 2000 after 
correction for selection bias. He finds a mean log return of about 15% and an arithmetic average return of 59%. Peng 
(2001) using the same database as Cochrane reports a geometric average return for 1987 to 1999 of 55.18%. 
However Peng does not correct for selection bias. 
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only eleven companies, and the authors do not investigate portfolio strategies. Brophy/Guthner 
(1988) provide estimates of risk and return and compute beta relative to the S&P500 index for 
twelve funds using weekly data from 1981 to 1985. They compute returns of different portfolios 
and conclude that they achieve superior returns compared to the S&P500 and to growth-oriented 
mutual funds. But none of these studies investigates the risk and return characteristics or the 
investment behavior of LPE for a larger sample size and for a longer time period. Also the impact 
of the “down market” after 2000 has not been subject of any study. One major contribution of 
this paper is to investigate the risk and return characteristics of various portfolio strategies, which 
is of special relevance due to the weighting and rebalancing issue. In this context we investigate 
three potential biases in computed risk and return figures, caused by thin trading, the bid-ask 
spread, and sample selection/survivorship. The nature of these biases is not new in the academic 
literature, but their impact for private equity returns is very important to recognize, as will be 
shown.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide a detailed description of 
our database which covers the most complete sample of LPE vehicles analyzed in the literature so 
far. This Section also contains our definition and selection criteria for LPE which is consistently 
used throughout the sample period from 1986 to 2003. At the end of this Section, we define and 
evaluate several minimum liquidity conditions that reduce the basic sample of 287 vehicles to a 
restricted portfolio of 122 liquid instruments. In Section 3 we investigate basic risk and return 
characteristics of three different portfolio strategies (indices) applied to the restricted sample. In 
Section 4 we discuss the three potential biases in computed risk and return figures. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Database and sample construction 
In this paper, instruments are classified as LPE if the underlying business is PE investing, but the 
funds themselves are quoted on an exchange. Companies which only partly invest in private 
equity, e.g. investment banks, holding companies, venture capital pools and the likes are 
excluded. The respective instruments fall into three categories: 
• listed companies whose core business is private equity (e.g. 3i), 
• quoted investment funds, which invest a predetermined proportional equity share to 
specific private firms together with the company’s private funds (i.e. Schroder Ventures 
Trust), 
• specially structured investment vehicles which invest in private equity directly (e.g. 
investing into private companies), and/or indirectly through various private funds. (i.e. 
Castle Private Equity). 
The underlying private equity investments of these instruments include all kinds of 
financing stages and styles. Portfolio companies of these vehicles receive financing in the early, 
later and expansion stage, but also buyouts and turnaround situations are financed. Based on this 
definition, we find a total of 287 listed companies between 1986 and 2003. At the beginning of 
the sample period, only eight companies were listed, which shows the dramatic growth in this 
market segment. From the 287 instruments, only 237 match our definition over the whole 
observation period. The remaining 50 vehicles were either acquired, delisted from the exchange, 
or changed their businesses. 
The temporal behavior of the number of listings is displayed in Table 1. Most vehicles 
(i.e. 173 of the 287) have been listed over the past six years only, many of which concentrating 
on the financing of young technology firms. In contrast, only five were listed in 1973. In the late 
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eighties, there was a wave of listings (35), mainly in Europe, concentrating on management 
buyouts. With respect to the regional characteristics of the vehicles, over 50% are listed in 
Europe, most of them in the UK (113) where Investment Trusts and Venture Capital Trusts are 
widely spread because of tax alleviation. Almost 30% are listed in North America and more than 
10% in Asia. In terms of (average) market capitalization 38.23% of the overall market value is 
quoted in Europe and 24.90% in North America. The median of only $22 million shows that most 
companies have a rather small market capitalization.  
As with other alternative investments, a major practical restriction of LPE investments is 
illiquidity. We define a set of minimum liquidity conditions in order to assess the risk and return 
characteristics of LPE and to compare them with traditional stock market investments. However, 
unlike with other alternative investments, the availability of market information makes it possible 
to compute various liquidity measures. Specifically, our selection process is based on the 
following criteria:  
1.  We require a minimum of 30 weekly price observations in order to ensure accuracy of 
parameter estimates.  
2.  The vehicles must have a minimum average market capitalization of $2 million. 
3.  To assure a minimal trading activity, we impose a minimum average trading volume of 
0.1% per week2; the (relative) trading volume is defined by the ratio of the trading 
volume multiplied by the price, and the market value of the vehicle.  
                                                 
2
 Compared to the relative trading volume of 2.1% per week of AIM companies in the first 6 months of 1996 which 
was analyzed by Board/Vila/Wells (1998). 
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4.  Minimum trade continuity must be satisfied. This is measured by the percentage of 
weeks (here, 15%) within which at least one transaction occurs.3 
5.  Finally, we require a maximum average bid-ask spread of 20%, which is defined 
relative to the arithmetic average of the bid and ask quotes.   
 Based on these constraints, 165 or 57% of the vehicles are excluded from the original 
sample resulting in a total of 122 instruments. It is apparent that illiquidity is a serious issue even 
in the segment of listed private equity investments. The impact of the most sensitive liquidity 
constraint, the bid-ask spread, is  documented in Table 2. A total of 62 vehicles which fulfill four 
out of five liquidity constraints are eliminated solely due to an average bid-ask spread of more 
than 20%. 
From the 122 companies satisfying our constraints, eight have been liquidated, changed 
their businesses, or have been acquired by another company over the sample period. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis of Sections 3 and 4 will be based on 114 companies. 
 
                                                 
3
 Board/Vila/Wells (1998) find that in the first 6 months of 1996 AIM companies were traded on 52% of all days, on 
average. 
   
 9 
3. Basic risk and return characteristics of LPE portfolios 
In this Section, we investigate the risk and return characteristics of portfolios, or indices, 
constructed from the 114 vehicles included in our liquid sample. There are several topics to be 
addressed in this context: First, as shown in Section 2, the number of listings steadily increases 
over the sample period (starting from just eight observations in 1986). In order to analyze 
portfolio returns over the whole observation period, the portfolio must be rebalanced whenever 
new listings take place. Second, the sample is extremely heterogeneous with respect to the market 
capitalization of the individual firms. Also, the evolution of capitalization over time (i.e. the 
performance of the companies) is very heterogeneous, including the whole range from high-fliers 
to flops. Third, although we have imposed minimum liquidity requirements as a selection 
criterion, the typical instrument in our sample is less liquid than a “traditional” stock. This fact 
substantially affects the measurement of performance; this issue is separately addressed in 
Section 4. We investigate three different portfolio strategies, or indices, in order to capture the 
first two topics adequately:  
• A value weighted portfolio, buy-and-hold (partially rebalanced): VW-BH 
The weights are determined by the relative market capitalization of the individual 
instruments. This basically represents an unbalanced strategy, except if a new listing 
occurs: capital is taken out of the existing vehicles and reinvested in the new portfolio 
constituent. A characteristic of the portfolio is that market capitalization varies 
considerably over time, and across different vehicles. The portfolio naturally allocates 
excessive weight to only a few companies, which is regarded as a disadvantage by many 
investors.  
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• An equally weighted portfolio, fully rebalanced: EW-RB 
An equal fraction of wealth is allocated to the individual instruments. In order to maintain 
constant equal weighting over time, the portfolio is rebalanced on a weekly basis.  
• An equally weighted portfolio, buy-and-hold (partially rebalanced): EW-BH 
The portfolio constituents are equally weighted at the beginning of our observation period 
(1986), without weekly rebalancing, except when new vehicles are listed.  
 The risk and return statistics such as means, standard deviations, Sharpe ratios, alphas, 
betas, and autocorrelation coefficients are displayed in Table 3a. All figures refer to continuously 
compounded rates of return. It is apparent that the volatility of the (partially rebalanced) VW-BH 
portfolio is more than twice as large as for the (fully rebalanced) EW-RB index, and is still 
substantially larger than the (partially rebalanced) EW-BH portfolio. This can be explained by the 
inferior diversification of the value weighted strategy. In fact, 79.39% of the average market 
capitalization of the 114 vehicles in the VW-BH index is represented by only ten vehicles, while 
the 72 smallest instruments account for only 5% of the market cap. The diversification effect of 
the rebalancing strategy is also reflected in a higher beta of the VW-BH index (which computed 
with respect to the MSCI World index). It is thus questionable whether a value-weighted 
portfolio, or index, is regarded as a valuable benchmark by investors seeking diversification in 
this asset class.  
Over the whole observation period from 1986 to 2003, the average annual return is clearly 
highest for the (fully rebalanced) EW-RB portfolio (15.99%), compared to the average returns of 
the other two strategies (5.43% and 5.91, respectively). These figures show the dramatic impact 
of rebalancing in this market segment. Splitting the sample in two subperiods (the first 
representing the boom market up to the year 2000, the second representing the down market after 
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March 2000), reveals the dramatic downturn of the private equity market, but again, confirms the 
substantial benefit from rebalancing. The loss represented by the weekly rebalanced EW-RB 
portfolio   (-35.39%) is substantially smaller than for the equally weighted buy-and-hold portfolio 
(-58.39%) or the value weighted buy-and-hold portfolio (–68.93%)4. 
Adjusting for risk basically confirms these findings. The Sharpe ratio of the EW-RB 
portfolio is 1.19 for the time period 1986 to 2000 and clearly exceeds the ratio found for the 
MSCI World index (0.47). The Sharpe ratios of the other two portfolios are virtually zero. 
Jensen’s alpha for the time period 1986 to 2003 is 10.18% for the EW-RB portfolio, essentially 
zero for the EW-BH portfolio, and even negative (–1.20%) for the VW-BH index. The MSCI 
World index is again used as the benchmark portfolio. The R2-coefficients of the underlying 
regression are rather small. This shows that private equity exhibits a large, specific and thus, 
diversifiable variance component with respect to standard equity investments. This is also 
reflected in the beta coefficients, which are, for the EW-RB and EW-BH portfolio returns, 
significantly below one (0.60 and 0.70, respectively). One is tempted to conclude that LPE is not 
exposed to so much risk as generally assumed.5  
Table 3b finally displays the autocorrelation structure of the portfolio returns. 
Interestingly, the EW-RB portfolio exhibits statistically significant positive serial correlations up 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Bernstein/ Wilkinson (1997) for a more detailed characterization of the rebalancing bonus. 
5
 Risk of private equity investments is often stated as rather high: See French (1988). Yet, measuring risk with the 
volatility of private equity is very problematic when estimated from private investments because accounting data 
does not reveal the relevant risk exposure. Therefore, volatility of private equity is usually underestimated in the 
generally understood sense. Estimations of risk from listed equity give us a better indicator for the real risk exposure. 
However, volatility from observed market prices still does not account for the whole risk exposure. Compared to the 
highly liquid stock market indices our LPE index is rather illiquid. This issue is discussed in section 4. 
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to five lags, which is the consequence of a thin trading effect due to the relatively large weights 
of small firms in equally weighted indices. Consistent with this interpretation, the value weighted 
portfolio (VW-BH) exhibits much less serial correlation. The bias induced by serial correlation 
for estimating return volatility will be discussed in Section 4. Finally, it is not surprising that the 
results of the two buy-and-hold portfolios (EW-BH and VW-BH) are rather similar, despite their 
different weighting scheme: This is due to the fact that over time, the weighting of the buy-and-
hold strategy converges to the value-weighted equity mix.6 Therefore, some of the shortcomings 
of the VW-BH portfolio also apply to the equally weighted counterpart. This is especially true in 
the period after 2000, when only a few new listings are observed.  
 
4. Performance biases 
4.1       Limited liquidity, and the volatility bias 
Although we have already imposed several liquidity constraints on our original sample, the 
limited liquidity of many instruments is still a serious problem in our sample. The serial 
correlation of portfolio returns can be used as a statistical measure for this problem; this is shown 
by Getmansky/ Lo/ Makarov (2003) for a sample of hedge funds. The authors also demonstrate 
that the estimated volatility of portfolios containing illiquid securities is lower than the true 
volatility. It is shown in Table 3b that the equally weighted portfolio returns reveal strong 
autocorrelation: For the EW-RB portfolio, we find statistically significant positive 
autocorrelations at the first five lags, and the EW-BH portfolio exhibits significant positive 
                                                 
6
 See Roll (1983). 
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autocorrelations at the second, fourth and fifth lag.7 The Ljung-Box Q-statistic clearly rejects the 
null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation for the first five lags. In contrast, there is no significant 
autocorrelation in the weekly returns of the MSCI World index. There is a vast body of literature 
on autocorrelation patterns in stock returns. For weekly returns, Campbell/Lo/MacKinlay (1997) 
report statistically significant first-order autocorrelation for the CRSP equally-weighted index of 
0.203 from July 1962 to December 1994. 
Positive autocorrelation in returns leads to a downward bias in estimated risk parameters. 
A formula to adjust for this bias is suggested by Hamilton (1994).8 Table 4a shows the adjusted 
variance estimates, as well as the adjusted Sharpe ratios, betas9 and alphas, as compared to the 
standard measures. The adjusted risk estimates are considerably higher for both portfolios: the 
standard deviation for the full 1986-2003 period is 33.69% (37.09%) instead of 19.34% (26.93%) 
for the EW-RB (EW-BH) portfolio. The respective beta coefficient is 0.99 (1.09) instead of 0.57 
                                                 
7
 We only measure the linear dependence of concurrent returns on lagged returns. For the first and third week, we do 
not find statistical significance for linear dependence of concurrent returns which does not exclude any non-linear 
dependence. 
8
 See Hamilton (1994), p.188. A problem arises since it is not possible to set K=infinite since the number of 
observations is limited. French/Schwert/Stambaugh (1987), for example, set K=1. They argue that in the case of non-
synchronous trading, daily returns are autocorrelated particularly at lag one. For weekly returns, Lo/McKinlay (1990) 
report (small) positive autocorrelation at lags two to twelve, but negative autocorrelation (mean-reversion) for 
measurement intervals over one quarter. This leads to the difficulty of identifying the appropriate number of lags. 
Including too many lags could lead to excessive noise in the estimated variances. We somehow arbitrarily choose 
K=20.  
9
 We run the regression of LPE portfolio returns against three lagged, matching and three leading returns. See 
Dimson (1979).  
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(0.47). The adjusted Sharpe ratio is 0.33 (0.03) instead of 0.57 (0.04), while the alpha is virtually 
unchanged: 10.43% (-0.05%) instead of 10.18% (-0.09%). 
We conclude that the adjustment for autocorrelation has a substantial impact on the risk 
estimates of private equity, as well as on the Sharpe ratio. However, compared with a Sharpe 
ratio of 0.09 for the global stock market (from 1986 to 2003), the performance of the EW-RB 
LPE portfolio is still by far superior even after correcting for the volatility bias.  
 
4.2      Rebalancing – and the bid-ask bias  
We have shown in Table 3a that the EW-RB portfolio exhibits a considerably higher average 
return than the other two portfolios. This could be due to the so called “rebalancing bonus”. Early 
papers of Blume/Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) discuss the problem of estimating and 
comparing returns from rebalanced and buy-and-hold strategies. In particular, Blume/Stambaugh 
attribute differences in mean returns to the use of closing prices which differ from (unobservable) 
market clearing prices: This is due to the fact that observed closing prices bounce arbitrarily 
between the effective closing bid and ask price. A typical investor who implements a rebalancing 
strategy is forced to buy at the ask price and to sell at the bid price. The bid-ask effect leads to an 
upward bias of closing price returns compared to the returns computed from actual market prices. 
Unfortunately, effective daily bid-ask spreads are not available for our sample. Therefore, our 
estimate of the bias is based on averages for each vehicle. We assume that investors lose half of 
the average BAS in each transaction. This amount is subtracted from the weekly EW-RB 
portfolio returns throughout the sample period. For the EW-BH portfolio, the adjustment is only 
done after new listings. Based on the fact that 25% (31) of the vehicles in our sample have a BAS 
of 10% or more, we expect a considerable impact of the bid-ask effect.  
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 The characteristics of the adjusted portfolio returns are displayed in Table 4b. It is 
apparent that the BAS-effect for the EW-RB index is substantial. For the overall sample period, it 
amounts to a mean bias of 8.33%, in the down market from 2000-2003 the bias is even 10.95%. 
In contrast, the bias is only 0.39% for the EW-BH index. The interesting observation is that even 
after controlling for this bias, the EW-RB portfolio shows a clearly higher return compared to the 
EW-BH portfolio in the down-market from 2000 to 2003. It appears that the benefits of the 
diversification effect of a rebalancing strategy outweigh the additional cost in an adverse market 
environment.  
4.3 The “ex ante” selection bias and “ex post” survivorship bias. 
Two potential selection biases could affect our results: The first bias could emerge from our 
selection rule. LPE was a new and not well defined asset class in the mid-eighties; while our 
definition and selection rule (see Section 2) is adequate for the past few years, applying the same 
criteria in retrospect to the vehicles which were available 20 years ago, is to some extent 
arbitrary. However, the associated ex-post selection bias can at least be minimized if the selection 
rule is applied consistently over the whole sample period. We not only traced all new listings 
which fit our definition of a LPE vehicle, but also assured that the selected vehicles still fit this 
definition throughout the entire time period.  
The second type of selection bias is generally known as survivorship bias. Excluding 
delisted vehicles generally leads to an upward bias in computed returns as has been demonstrated 
in various studies in the literature. The focus of most studies was on mutual fund performance, 
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where the survivorship bias accounts for 0.1% to 1.5% annualized return bias, depending on the 
instruments (stocks, bonds), the time period, and the sample of funds.10  
We have noticed in Section 2 that from the overall sample of 287 firms, only 237 vehicles 
survived our observation period. 50 vehicles disappeared from the sample for the following 
reasons: 
• Nine vehicles were acquired by other companies; in four cases they were acquired by 
another LPE company which was already included in our sample.  
• A group of 18 vehicles changed their businesses. Often these companies merged with one 
of their subsidiaries and decided to concentrate on the business of the latter.  
• We found 15 vehicles that were delisted from the exchange or whose trading was 
suspended. In eight cases we could not exactly trace either the reasons for delisting or the 
exact date of disappearance from the stock exchange. Thus we excluded these eight 
vehicles from the analysis.  
 The remaining 42 vehicles were all delisted in the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. To be 
consistent with our analysis in this paper, we will only estimate a survivorship bias for those 
vehicles out of the 42 which satisfied our liquidity criteria.11 Eight vehicles satisfy our liquidity 
constraints while the other 34 vehicles did not, especially in the time period right before they 
disappeared from the sample. Four out of these eight vehicles were delisted or trading was 
suspended, two vehicles were acquired, and the remaining two changed their businesses.  
                                                 
10
 See e.g. Grinblatt/Titman (1989), Blake/Elton/Gruber (1993), Brown/Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995), 
Elton/Gruber/Blake (1996), Carhart (1997), Carhart/Carpenter/Lynch/Musto (2000). 
11
 An indication of the survivorship bias for the overall sample will be given in section 5. 
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In order to quantify the survivorship bias caused by the eight vehicles, we adopt the 
“follow the money” procedure of Elton/Gruber/Blake (1996) with raw returns.12 This means that 
if a vehicle is delisted for whatever reason, the capital is equally allocated across all remaining 
vehicles. The survivorship bias is then measured by comparing the returns of a survivorship-free 
index which includes the eight delisted vehicles (i.e. contains all 122 liquid vehicles) with our 
previous index which is just based on the 114 (liquid) surviving vehicles.  
The results are displayed in Table 4c for three different time periods. The surprising result 
is that both the EW-RB and the EW-BH portfolios exhibit a “positive” survivorship bias over the 
entire sample period: including the non-surviving vehicles leads to higher (!) returns. To our 
knowledge, no similar result has been reported in the performance literature. A possible 
explanation is that bad company performance explains only four of the eight delistings. In two 
cases, two high performing instruments were subsequently acquired, and two vehicles that 
changed their business also demonstrated a better performance than the surviving ones. This 
could explain the positive survivorship bias. We conclude that the adjustment for survivorship 
bias is not as important as correcting for autocorrelation and the bid-ask spread.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In contrast to former studies estimating the performance of private equity investments, this paper 
is based on market prices of listed, or publicly traded, private equity vehicles – not book values. 
Our sample includes a total of 287 LPE vehicles over the time period 1986 to 2003, which 
represents all listings on international exchanges for which stock price data are available. In order 
                                                 
12
 Elton/Gruber/Blake (1996) reported risk adjusted measures of survivorship bias in addition to measures based on 
raw returns.  
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to get accurate measures of risk and return, several liquidity constraints are imposed. They have a 
strong impact on the size of the resulting sample. The major part of the empirical work conducted 
in this paper is based on a subsample including 114 liquid stocks. We moreover address the 
problems and biases in computing portfolio returns for this asset class; rebalancing turns out to be 
a particularly important issue, and strongly affects the reported risk and return figures.  
In order to measure the performance of these vehicles adequately, we investigate the risk and 
return characteristics of two partially rebalanced portfolios (equally-weighted and value-
weighted) and a fully rebalanced (equally weighted) portfolio. Not surprisingly, the performance 
of LPE is high in the period from 1986 to 2000. The Sharpe ratios of 1.19 and 0.74 exceed the 
respective value of the MSCI World stock market (0.47). The results dramatically change if the 
subsequent years (up to March 2003) are included in the analysis. Compared with a Sharpe ratio 
of 0.09 for the world stock market, only the fully rebalanced equally weighted strategy has a 
clearly superior performance (Sharpe ratio 0.57) – the two other strategies exhibit ratios close to 
zero. This demonstrates the importance of the selected investment style (in terms of weighting 
and rebalancing) in studying the performance of LPE.  
  Because the liquidity of most LPE vehicles is small compared to traditional stock market 
investments, several performance biases are investigated. Our analysis reveals that standard 
volatility estimates are strongly downward biased due to the artificial autocorrelations in LPE 
returns. Taking into account adjusted risk estimates, the Sharpe ratio for the fully rebalanced 
strategy decreases from 0.57 to 0.33 and is still above the world stock market. We moreover 
investigate the bid-ask bias in our rebalancing strategies. For the equally-weighted portfolio, the 
average annual return bias 8.33% over the entire sample period, which is dramatic. Thus, 
essentially the full return premium of the rebalanced strategy disappears if the bid-ask spread is 
taken into account in implementing the portfolio adjustments. We finally report estimates of the 
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survivorship bias by including the eight (liquid) non-surviving vehicles in our analysis. 
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the standard performance literature, we find a small positive bias 
in essentially all periods.  
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Number of listings over time 
The table shows the descriptive statistics on the number of listings that occurred until 2002. Before 1986 
13 vehicles were listed and in 1986 only 3. The table moreover shows the listings in a two year time frame.  










 Total 287 100.00%
Datasource: Primark Datastream






 Impact of the bid-ask spread constraint on sample size 
The table highlights the impact of the average bid-ask spread liquidity constraint on sample size. The second row of 
the table (overall sample) contains the number of vehicles that belong to the quantiles specified in row one. In the 
third row (after liquidity constraints) we report the vehicles that fulfill four out of five liquidity criteria i.e. the 
minimum number of weekly observations, the minimum average market capitalization, the minimum relative 
trading volume and  the  minimum continuity of trade. The last row (difference) is the difference between the 
second and third row. For example 124 vehicles out of the total sample have a bid-ask spread greater than 20%. Out 
of these 124 a total of 62 vehicles fulfill the remaining four liquidity criteria which shows the dramatic impact of the 







constraints w/o average 
bid-ask spread
difference 
smaller than 5% 82 66 16 (20%)
5% - 10% 36 25 11 (31%)
10% - 15% 25 18 7 (28%)
15% - 20% 20 13 7 (35%)
20% - 25% 15 4 11 (73%)
25% - 50% 23 4 19 (83%)




   
 23 
Table 3a 
Risk and return of three LPE portfolio strategies 
All figures are based on weekly (annualized) returns of the different LPE portfolios (114 vehicles) computed 
from 1st January 1986 - 19th March 2003, 1st January 1986 - 16th February 2000 and 16th February 2000 – 




1986 - 2003 5.43% 43.18% 0.01 -1.20% 1.2 0.17          
1986 - 2000 19.37% 40.77% 0.35 7.16% 1.08 0.18           




1986 - 2003 15.99% 19.34% 0.57 10.18% 0.6 0.22          
1986 - 2000 27.21% 18.44% 1.19 18.21% 0.58 0.18           




1986 - 2003 5.91% 26.93% 0.04 -0.09% 0.74 0.17          
1986 - 2000 22.26% 22.81% 0.74 12.37% 0.72 0.13           













The table shows the weekly autocorrelation up to five lags and the Ljung-Box Statistics for five lags with its p-
value for the different LPE portfolios. For comparison, the statistics of the MSCI (World) are reported as well.  
AC 1 0.114** 0.151** 0.058 -0.022
AC 2 -0.012 0.159** 0.150** 0.06
AC 3 0.053 0.115** 0.007 0.049
AC 4 0.037 0.099** 0.072* -0.061
AC 5 0.075* 0.077* 0.098** -0.014
Q 5 20.588 69.337 36.518 9.234
p-value 0.001 0 0 0.1
EW-BH 114 MSCI (World)
*/** denotes that the correlation is significant at the 5%/1% level.
Autocorrelations
01/1986 - 03/2003
VW-BH 114 EW-RB 114
 




The table shows the risk and return, the alpha and beta as well as the Sharpe ratio of the EW-RB and EW-BH 
portfolios with and without adjustment for autocorrelation.  
EW-RB
USD USD
Mean SD Alpha Beta
15.99% 19.34% 10.18% 0.6 0.57 33.69% 0.33 10.43% 0.99
EW-BH
USD USD
Mean SD Alpha Beta




























Bid-ask spread bias  
Return figures are provided before the adjustment for the bid-ask spread (standard mean) and after the 
adjustment for the bid-ask spread (adjusted mean) for both the EW-RB and the EW-BH LPE portfolio.  
EW-RB Adjusted Standard EW-BH Adjusted Standard
USD Mean Mean USD Mean Mean
1986 – 2003 7.65% 15.99% 8.33% 1986 – 2003 5.52% 5.91% 0.39%
1986 – 2000 19.45% 27.21% 7.76% 1986 - 2000 22.04% 22.26% 0.21%






This table shows the impact of the survivorship bias in our (liquid) sample. For example we report a (positive!) 
survivorship bias of 1.81% for the EW-BH portfolio for 1986-2003. 
EW-RB Adjusted Standard EW-BH Adjusted Standard
USD Mean Mean USD Mean Mean
(n=122) (n=114) (n=122) (n=114)
1986 – 2003 16.35% 15.99% 0.36% 1986 - 2003 7.72% 5.91% 1.81%
1986 – 2000 27.85% 27.21% 0.64% 1986 - 2000 22.44% 22.26% 0.18%
2000 – 2003 -36.29% -35.39% -0.90% 2000 - 2003 -59.68% -68.93% 9.25%
Difference Difference
 
 
 
 
